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GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT
FAILURE TO DETAIN DRUNK DRIVERS
Alcohol impaired driving seriously threatens public health and
safety in the United States. In 1990 alone, nearly twenty-three thou-
sand people lost their lives in traffic accidents involving drivers who
had some degree of alcohol in their blood.' In fact, an alcohol re-
lated fatality occurs every twenty-four minutes, and two of every five
Americans will be involved in an alcohol related accident at some
time during their lives.2 The costs of these accidents are astronomi-
cal-between ten and fifteen billion dollars per year.3 Thus, "[n]o
one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving
problem or the [s]tates' interest in eradicating it."*
In response to the seriousness of the drunk driving problem,
many groups, including the insurance industry,5 citizen groups such
as Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD),6 and both federal and
state governments, 7 have taken severe measures to limit the extent
of drunk driving and its inevitable consequences. 8 For example, in
1984 President Reagan signed legislation requiring states to raise
the legal drinking age to 21 or lose federal highway funds.9 In 1988,
Congress enacted the Drunk Driving Prevention Act of 1988 which
1 NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANS., DRUNK
DRIVING FACTS 1 (July 1991). The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration re-
ported that 22,084 people were killed in alcohol related accidents. This number repre-
sents approximately 50% of all traffic deaths in 1990.
2 Id. Former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop also reported that an additional
534,000 people are injured annually in alcohol related accidents-an average of one per
minute. See Press Conference Concerning Drunk Driving by C. Everett Koop, United States Surgeon
General, Fed. News. Serv., May 31, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Fedrew file
[hereinafter Koop Press Conference].
3 Koop Press Conference, supra note 2.
4 Michigan v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2485 (1990).
5 For example, some major insurers (one as part of a six million dollar anti-drunk
driving campaign) have supplied passive alcohol sensors to local law enforcement agen-
cies. These sensors, which measure the alcohol on a driver's breath, can be used as
preliminary screening mechanisms. See Ruth Gastel, Drunk Driving and Liquor Liability,
INS. INFO. INST. REP., Jan. 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, IIRPRT file.
6 MADD, a nonprofit corporation with over 2.95 million members, seeks to solve
the drunk driving crisis by lobbying state and federal governments for strict drinking
and driving laws and by implementing programs aimed at increasing public awareness of
the drunk driving problem's seriousness. MADD's History, Oct. 1990, at 1.
7 Since 1981, more than 1250 laws to combat drunk driving have been enacted
across the United States. Id.
8 Gastel, supra note 5.
9 Id. By 1988, all states had increased the drinking age to 21 (although Ohio and
South Dakota allowed those younger than 21 to buy beer). Id.
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awards states additional federal highway funds for adopting certain
drunk driving countermeasures.' 0
Several state legislatures have also passed a variety of laws to
combat drunk driving, including "dram shop" laws that affix liability
to alcohol vendors for injuries caused by drunk drivers,I l laws that
increase penalties for driving while intoxicated ("DWI"), 2 laws that
authorize police roadblocks to check for drunk drivers, and restitu-
tion laws that require drunk drivers to pay for the cost of drunk driv-
ing arrests and emergency services.' 3
Courts have responded to this national crisis as well. 14 Re-
cently, the United States Supreme Court ruled that sobriety check-
points do not violate the Fourth Amendment and are a valid tool for
combating drunk driving.' 5 The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled
that social hosts may be liable to injured third persons for serving
alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest and allowing him to drive
drunk.16 Moreover, an increasing number of state courts are finding
the police, and their government employers, liable for negligent
failure to detain a drunk driver who subsequently injures or kills a
10 Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 9001-9005, 102 Stat. 4181, 4521-27 (codified at 23
U.S.C. § 410). This incentive legislation suspends a drunk driver's license, establishes
an anti-drunk driving program, and requires a police officer to administer a blood-alco-
hol level test if he has probable cause to believe that a driver involved in a serious acci-
dent has been drinking. Gastel, supra note 5.
11 By 1989, all but I 1 states had either judicially or legislatively imposed liability
upon sellers of alcohol; the following states had not imposed liability: Arkansas, Con-
necticut, California, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada,
and North Dakota. See DeniseJ. Lord, Note, Beyond Social Host Liability: Accomplice Liabil-
ity, 19 CUMB. L. REv. 553, 559 n.32 (1989); Mary H. Seminara, Note, When the Party's
Over: McGuiggan v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. and the Emergence of a
Social Host Liability Standard in Massachusetts, 68 B.U. L. REv. 193, 194-96 (1988).
12 Maine, Oregon, Utah, Vermont and California have decreased the percentage of
blood alcohol content from .10 to .08 in their definition of drunk driving. First time
DWI offenders are automatically jailed in 14 states, and in Rhode Island and 20 other
states, first offenders are required to face a panel of victims' families. See Gastel, supra
note 5.
'3 Id.
14 Although many, including President Bush and Congress, consider this problem a
national crisis, Surgeon General Koop refused to officially declare it as such because a
declaration of a crisis by the surgeon general would raise expectations "of immediate
success against drunk driving" which would only be disappointed. Koop Press Conference,
supra note 2.
15 See Michigan v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2488 (1990) (holding that checkpoint stops
to detect drunk drivers do not violate the Fourth Amendment because the government's
interest in preventing drunk driving outweighs any intrusion on the motorist's right to
privacy).
16 See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (NJ. 1984); see also McGuiggan v. New Eng.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 496 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Mass. 1986) (stating that a social host may be
liable for death caused by intoxicated guest's negligent operation of motor vehicle
shortly after leaving host's home).
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third party.' 7 This approach helps reduce the drunk driving prob-
lem by encouraging law enforcement to at least eliminate the known
drunk driving risks. Many courts, however, continue to shield the
government from liability in such situations, 8 because they do not
want to expose the police to liability for action or inaction in the
field, even though the resulting death or injury could have been
avoided had the officer simply done his job properly.
This Note examines police liability for negligent failure to de-
tain drunk drivers. Part I describes the two legal doctrines on which
courts have traditionally relied in granting police immunity from
negligence suits for failure to arrest drunk drivers: qualified govern-
mental immunity for discretionary functions 19 and the public duty
doctrine.20
Part II argues that court reliance on discretionary act immunity
and the public duty doctrine to insulate the government from liabil-
ity for negligent failure to detain a drunk driver is ill-founded.
Neither of these doctrines should provide the government with im-
munity when an officer knew that a particular driver was intoxicated.
Further, this section argues that when courts erect these artificial
barriers to protect the government, they contribute to the drunk
driving problem rather than providing an additional source of drunk
driving deterence. By recognizing governmental liability for negli-
gent failure to detain drunk drivers, courts serve tort law's compen-
satory2' and deterrent purposes. At the same time, they promote
the national goal of keeping intoxicated drivers off the road22 with-
out unduly inhibiting police behavior 23 or bankrupting the govern-
ment employer. 24
Part III proposes solutions that would prevent courts from ap-
plying discretionary act immunity and the public duty doctrine to
immunize the government and thus would ensure that these doc-
trines do not stand in the way of governmental liability. These
17 See Ransom v. City of Garden City, 743 P.2d 70 (Idaho 1987); Fudge v. City of
Kansas City, 720 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1986); Irwin v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292
(Mass. 1984); Weldy v. Town of Kingston, 514 A.2d 1257 (N.H. 1986); Bailey v. Town
of Forks, 737 P.2d 1257 (1987), modified, 753 P.2d 523 (Wash. 1988).
18 See Shore v. Town of Stonington, 444 A.2d 1379 (Conn. 1982); Everton v. Wil-
lard, 468 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1985); Fessler v. R.E.J., Inc., 514 N.E.2d 515 (Il. App. Ct.
1987), appeal denied, 520 N.E.2d 385 (Il1. 1988); Jones v. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park &
Planning Comm'n, 571 A.2d 859 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 571 A.2d 191 (Md.
1990); Schutte v. Sitton, 729 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. 1987); Crosby v. Town of Bethlehem, 457
N.Y.S.2d 618 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
19 See infra notes 31-91 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 92-135 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 165-75 and accompanying text.
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measures would prevent courts from relying on these artificial barri-
ers to immunize police and their government employers for negli-
gent failure to detain drunk drivers-a practice which is justified in
neither principle nor policy.
I
BACKGROUND
The primary purposes of civil tort actions are to compensate
the injured party for damage caused by another at the wrongdoer's
expense,25 and to deter future harm by the wrongdoer himself and
other potential defendants. 26
Negligence, the cause of action for unintended torts,27 is de-
fined as conduct "which falls below the standard established by law
for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm." 28 A
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1977); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROS-
SER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 7 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) [hereinaf-
ter PROSSER AND KEETON]. See Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs, 687 P.2d 728, 734
(N.M. 1984) ("We have consistently demonstrated our support for.., the compensatory
nature of tort remedies."); O'Connor v. City of New York, 447 N.E.2d 33, 36 (N.Y.
1983) (Wachtler, J., dissenting) (describing a basic tenet of tort law as: "[A] plaintiff is
entitled to compensation when he has been-injured by the defendant's failure to observe
standards of reasonable care under the circumstances.").
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1977); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note
25, § 4, at 25. ("The courts are concerned not only with compensation of the victim, but
with admonition of the wrongdoer. When the decisions of the courts become known,
and defendants realize that they may be held liable, there is of course a strong incentive
to prevent the occurrence of the harm."). See also Peoples Express Airlines, Inc. v. Con-
solidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107 (NJ. 1985); C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504, 517 (Utah
1988) (Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Barr v. Interbay Citizens
Bank of Tampa, 635 P.2d 441 (Wash. 1981), modified, 649 P.2d 827 (1982).
27 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, § 28, at 161. See also Crotwell v. Cowan, 198
So. 126, 127 (Ala. 1940) (Negligence is the foundation for liability for injury resulting
from the unintentional application of force, whether the act is affirmative or omissive);
Cahill v. Illinois C.R. Co., 125 N.W. 331, 333 (Iowa 1910) ("the very essence o negli-
gence is inadvertence"); Harris v. Penninger, 613 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Mo. 1981) (" 'negli-
gence' is strictly nonfeasance or a wrongful act resulting from inattention or
carelessness and not from design.").
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1964). "Negligence is the failure to use
such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would use under similar circum-
stances[.]" BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1032 (6th ed. 1990). An unreasonable risk is cre-
ated when there exists both a recognizable danger based on knowledge of facts and a
reasonable belief that harm may result. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, § 31, at
170. "To make conduct negligent the risk involved in it must be unreasonably great;
some injurious consequences of it must be not only possible or in a sense probable, but
unreasonably probable.... The essence of negligence is unreasonableness; due care is
simply reasonable conduct." Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARv. L. REV. 40,42 (1915).
See also Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works, 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049 (1856) ("Negli-
gence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those con-
siderations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do."); Brown v. Kendall, 60
Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 296 (1850) ("In general, [ordinary care] means that kind and de-
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traditional negligence action may be brought when one party
breaches a duty to adhere to those standards of conduct toward an-
other, and this breach causes injury to the second party.29 Negli-
gent conduct which causes injury creates liability on behalf of the
wrongdoer.
Some parties, however, are insulated from liability; no tort ac-
tion may be brought against them, regardless of their indifference to
the risk of serious harm to innocent victims.30 Courts often place
police officers and their government employers within this category
and shield the government from liability even though the officer
negligently failed to prevent an intoxicated individual from driving.
This section presents the current state of tort liability of police
officers and their government employers who negligently who fail to
detain drunk drivers. Although the traditional doctrine of absolute
sovereign immunity has been largely eroded, courts continue to
shield negligent police behavior from liability by relying on two doc-
trines: government immunity for discretionary acts and the public
duty doctrine.
A. Governmental Immunity
The common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity exempts the
government from tort liability unless the government explicitly con-
gree of care, which prudent and cautious men would use, such as is required by the
exigency of the case, and such as is necessary to guard against probable danger.").
29 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, § 30, at 164-65. Four elements are required
to show negligence:
1. Duty: a legal obligation to adhere to certain standards of conduct for
the protection of others against unreasonable risks.
2. Breach: failure, by act or omission, to conform to the standard of con-
duct prescribed by law.
3. Cause: a reasonably close causal connection between the deficient
conduct and the injury to another.
4. Damage: actual loss or injury to another resulting from the breach of
the duty.
Id.
30 See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, § 131, at 1032; Note, Police Liability for
Negligent Failure to Prevent Crime, 94 HARv. L. REV. 821, 823 (1981); EUGENE MCQUILUN,
THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPOrATIONS, §§ 53.79a, at 441 (3d rev. ed. 1984). See also
County of Sacramento v. Superior Court, 503 P.2d 1382, 1384 (Cal. 1972) (Statutory
immunity against tort claims is absolute and must be given effect unless manifestly con-
trary to legislative intent.); Hyde v. Buckalew, 393 N.W.2d 800, 802 (state may be sued
in tort only to extent of the limited liability provided in the Tort Claims Act) (Iowa
1986).
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sents to being sued.3 1 Accepted early on by American courts, 32 this
doctrine reflected the belief that judicial review of executive action
in tort suits threatened the independence of the executive branch
and the separation of powers.33 Originally, sovereign immunity
only applied to state and federal government action, but eventually
the doctrine was extended to immunize municipalities as well.34
Today most states, either through legislative action or judicial
decisions, have waived absolute governmental immunity and allow
injured plaintiffs to maintain civil causes of action against public of-
ficials.3 5 State legislation in the form of tort claims acts provides a
basis for holding the state or local governments liable for torts com-
mitted by their employees. 36 Although there are some statutorily or
31 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, § 131, at 1033. See also Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) ("A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of
any fofinal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the laws on which the
right depends."); United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286, 287-88 (1846) (cir-
cuit court had no jurisdiction to entertain suit against government, which cannot be
sued except by its consent through law).
32 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, § 131, at 1033 (citing Osborn v. Bank of
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824)); Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in
Tort, 34 YALE LJ. 1, 4 (1924-25). See Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 389
(1850); United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846).
33 Id. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, § 131, at 1033. The sovereign immunity
doctrine originated with the English jurisprudent notion that "the King can do no
wrong." Gary L. Sellers, Note, State Liabilityfor Negligent Fire Inspection, 13 CoLuM.J.L. &
SoC. PIOBs. 303, 306-07 (1977); Jayme S. Walker, Note, Insulating Negligent Police Behav-
ior in Indiana: Why the Victims of a Drunk Driver Negligently Released by a Police Officer Have No
Remedy, 23 VAL. U.L. REv. 665, 671 (1989). For an extensive discussion of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity and its historical background, see Borchard, supra note 32; Daniel
C. Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity Doctrine in the United States 1790-1955, 1966 U.
ILL. L.F. 795.
34 Walker, supra note 33, at 672-73. The terms sovereign immunity and govern-
ment immunity, though used interchangeably in court opinions, are actually distinct
concepts. Sovereign immunity applies only to the state, the sovereign. Governmental
immunity extends this immunity to local governments and other political subdivisions of
the state. See AM. JUR. 2D Municipal County, School and State Tort Liability § 3, at' 29-30
(1988). For purposes of this Note, the term "governmental immunity" applies to both
state and local government immunity.
35 All states nevertheless retain immunity for discretionary decisions. PROSSER AND
KEETON, supra note 25, § 131, at 1044.
36 See ALA. CODE §§ 11-93-1 to 11-93-3 (1985); AI.A. CODE §§ 41-9-60 to 41-9-74
(1991); ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 to 09.50.300 (1983 & Supp. 1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 12-820 to 12-826 (1982 & Supp. 1991); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 21-9-201 to 21-9-
304 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810 to 997.6 (West 1980 & Supp.
1992); CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 24-10-101 to 24-10-120 (1988 & Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN
STAT. ANN. §§ 4-141 to 4-165b (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 4001 to 4013 (Supp. 1991); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1201 to 1-1225 (1987); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.28 to 768.30 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-33-1 to 36-
33-6 (1987); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 662-1 to 662-17 (1988 & Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE
§§ 6-901 to 6-929 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, paras. 1-101 to 10-101 (Smith-Hurd
1987 & Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-16.5-1 to 34-4-16.5-22 (Burns 1986 &
Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 25.1 to 25A.24 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE
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judicially implemented limitations,3 7 these statutory waivers of im-
munity generally subject the government to the same liability as
nongovernmental entities. For example, the state, like the private
inspector, may be liable for injuries due to negligent fire inspec-
tion.38 Governmental entities may also be liable for injuries result-
ing from police officers' negligent use of motor vehicles.3 9
ANN. §§ 613A.1 to 613A.13 (West Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-6101 to 75-6119
(1989); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44.070 to 44.170 (Baldwin 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13:5101 to 13:5114 (West 1991 &Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 8101
to 8118 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. &JUD. PROC., §§ 5-401 to 5-
404 (1989 & Supp. 1991); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 258, §§ I to 13 (Law. Coop 1980 &
Supp. 1991); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1401 to 691.1415 (West 1987 & Supp.
1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.736 (West 1977 & Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 466.01 to 466.15 (West 1977.& Supp. 1992); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-46-1 to 11-46-
21 (Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 537.600 to 537.650 (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1992);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.675 (Vernon 1988); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 537.700 to 537.755
(Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-9-101 to 2-9-805 (1991); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 13-901 to 13-926 (1987 & Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.0305
to 41.039 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 541-B:1 to 541-B:22 (Supp
1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. 59: 1-1 to 59:12-3 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 41-4-1 to 41-4-29 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT §§ 8 to 28 (McKin-
ney 1989 & Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143.291 to 143.300.1 (1990 & Supp. 1991);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-12-02 to 32-12-04 (1976 & Supp. 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 32-12.1-01 to 32.12.1-15 (Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2743.01 to 2744.09
(Anderson 1981 & Supp. 1991); OKuA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51 §§ 151 to 172 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.260 to 30.300 (1988 & Supp. 1990); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 8521 to 8528 (1982 & Supp. 1991); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8541 to
8564 (1982 & Supp. 1991); 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2310 (Purdon Supp. 1991); R.I.
GEN. LAWs §§ 9-31-1 to 9-31-13 (1985 & Supp. 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-10 to
15-78-190 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 3-21-1 to 3-21-11
(Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 9-8-101 to 9-8-407 (1987 & Supp. 1991); TEX. CIV.
PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001 to 101.109 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992); TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 104.001 to 104.008 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992); TEX. Crv.
PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 107.001 to 107.005 (West Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 63-30-1 to 63-30-38 (1989 & Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5601 to 5605
(1973 & Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-195.1 to 8.01-195.9 (Michie 1984 & Supp.
1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-222 (Michie 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.92.005 to
4.92.270 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.96.010 to 4.96.030
(West 1988); W. VA. CODE §§ 14-2-1 to 14-2-29 (1991); W. VA. CODE §§ 29-12A-I to 29-
12A-18 (1986 & Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.80 to 893.82 (West 1983 & Supp.
1991); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-39-101 to 1-39-120 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
37 Governmental entities are not liable for those actions explicitly excluded by the
state's tort claims act. For example, tort claims acts provide immunity for discretionary
acts. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 820.2 (West 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, para. 2-201
(1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
38 Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241 (Alaska 1976). However, some jurisdictions
have held that the government's statutory duty to inspect business premises for fire
hazards is a function for which the government retains immunity. See Reid v. Allen, 349
N.W.2d 806 (Mich. 1984).
39 See, e.g., Brummett v. County of Sacramento, 582 P.2d 952 (Cal. 1978); Thain v.
City of New York, 313 N.Y.S.2d 484 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) (city liable for officers' failure
to warn other drivers with lights and siren before entering intersection at high speed),
aff'd, 280 N.E.2d 892 (N.Y. 1972) (although employees immune from liability for negli-
gent acts, county would nonetheless be liable for damages).
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Absent the absolute protection of the sovereign immunity doc-
trine, a government entity may be liable for the tortious acts of its
officials. If an officer is acting within the scope of his employment,
his actions are considered the actions of his governmental em-
ployer, and a cause of action accrues against the government. 40
Thus, those injured as a result of an officer's negligent acts commit-
ted within the scope of the officer's employment may seek redress
against the government, subject to legislative and judicial limita-
tions on government liability.
1. Discretionary versus Ministerial Acts
Although the waiver of governmental immunity has made tort
actions based upon police negligence possible, government entities
still retain some degree of immunity.4 1 For example, every state has
retaiied immunity for government officials acting in their discre-
tionary capacity.42
The discretionary-ministerial function distinction43 provides
government immunity for acts of employees involving "discretion-
ary functions or duties." 44 Discretionary functions are those "char-
acterized by a high degree of discretion and judgment involved in
40 David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountabilityfor Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1, 55 (1972) (An officer's personal privilege protects him from personal
liability if he acts "in good faith and with a reasonable although erroneous belief that his
act was authorized .... ). The immunity of the officer is equivalent to the immunity of
the government; if the officer is acting within the scope of his employment and is liable,
the government is liable. Thus, the question is not whether the plaintiff can recover
against the officer or the State, but whether the plaintiff can recover at all. See Louis L.
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209-13
(1963), for a discussion of the immunities of officer and government as "coterminous."
41 Every state uses the discretionary-ministerial distinction and grants immunity to
government officials for actions involving choices with respect to policy issues. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895(B) (1965).
42 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, § 131, at 1044. Although discretionAry im-
munity may be formulated such that it describes the "privilege" of the government ac-
tor, this immunity is the government's as well as the actor's. Jaffe, supra note 40, at 212-
13. See, e.g., MASS ANN. LAws ch. 258, § 10(b) (West 1988) (exempting from liability
"any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function or duty on the part of a public employer or public employee,
acting within the scope of his office or employment, whether or not the discretion in-
volved is abused.")
43 This distinction originated in American case law (Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15, 36 (1953) ("[w]here there is room for policy judgment and decision there is
discretion")), and has been incorporated into many state statutes which abrogate abso-
lute governmental immunity but retain qualified immunity for government officials.
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, § 131, at 1046.
44 Discretionary immunity was originally incorporated into statutory law by the
Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946, 60 Stat. 842. Currently, provisions of this statute are
found at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671, 2672, 2674-80. The
Federal Tort Claims Act provides that the government is liable "in the same manner and
to the same extent as a private individual under the circumstances," 28 U.S.C. § 2674
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weighing alternatives and making choices with respect to public pol-
icy and planning."45 Two rationales underlie this distinction. First,
as with the doctrine of sovereign immunity, "certain governmental
activities are legislative or executive in nature and any judicial con-
trol of those activities, in tort suits or otherwise, would disrupt the
balanced separation of powers of the three branches of govern-
ment."' 46 Second, absent this grant of immunity for such actions,
government actors would be reluctant to make discretionary deci-
sions and carry out their responsibilities. 47
Discretionary immunity has been broadly interpreted to include
government conduct involving policy judgments.48 For example,
the decision whether or not to replace a major bridge is discretion-
ary because it involves the evaluation of broad policy factors. 49
With regard to police actions, difficult factual choices surrounding
the power to arrest are considered discretionary. 50 For example,
the officer's decision whether certain behavior or evidence consti-
(1988), but retains immunity for all governmental conduct that involves.a "discretionary
function or duty." Id § 2680(a).
States also have similar statutes which abrogate absolute governmental immunity,
but retain the discretionary-ministerial distinction. See, e.g., The Massachusetts Tort
Claims Act, which provides that
[p]ublic employers shall be liable for injury or loss of property or per-
sonal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission
of any public employee while acting within the scope of his office or em-
ployment, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individ-
ual under like circumstances....
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 258, § 2 (West 1988). Exempted from such liability, however, is
"any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function or duty on the part of a public employer or public employee,
acting within the scope of his office or employment, whether or not the discretion in-
volved is abused." Id. § 10(b). A South Carolina statute exempts from liability "the
exercise of discretion or judgment by the government entity or employee or the per-
formance or failure to perform any act or service which is in the discretion or judgment
of the governmental entity or employee." S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(5) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1990).
45 Irwin v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292, 1298 (Mass. 1984) (quoting Whitney v.
Worcester, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1216 (Mass. 1977)).
46 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, § 131, at 1039.
47 Ransom v. City of Garden City, 734 P.2d 70, 73 (Idaho 1987).
48 PROSSER AND KEEroN, supra note 25, at 1039. But see Whitney, 366 N.E.2d at 1217.
In Whitney, the court stated that immunity does not extend to all acts requiring policy
judgment because "the performance of all functions involves the exercise of discretion
and judgment to some degree." Id. at 1217. The court described discretionary acts as
those "characterized by the high degree of discretion and judgment involved in weigh-
ing alternatives and making choices with respect to public policy and planning." Id. at
1216. Those acts that involve "the carrying out of previously established policies or
plans" are not discretionary in nature. Id.
49 Julius Rothschild & Co. v. State, 655 P.2d 877 (Haw. 1982).
50 Jaffe, supra note 40, at 218-19.
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tutes probable cause to search or arrest is protected by discretionary
immunity.5'
On the other hand, if the conduct is ministerial in nature, that is
if the act involves implementing established plans and policies, the
government is subject to liability for its employees' torts. 52 For ex-
ample, a fire department's decision to establish a maximum speed
limit for fire trucks is discretionary. If the driver of the truck ex-
ceeds this limit and causes injury, however, the city is liable because
once the limit was established, the employee's ffinction became min-
isterial.53 Thus, whether a government act is categorized as ministe-
rial or discretionary determines whether the government is subject
to liability.
a. Discretionary Acts: No Liability
In the context of negligent failure to arrest drunk drivers, the
vagueness of the terms "ministerial" and "discretionary" has led to
inconsistent results. 54 Courts focus on different factors to deter-
mine whether an act is discretionary, and as a result, come to differ-
ent conclusions about whether failure to arrest a drunk driver is
discretionary or ministerial.
The discretionary immunity doctrine has effectively protected
police from liability to injured third parties. 55 Courts which empha-
size the need for police officers to use discretion when making any
arrest have found that the decision to detain a drunk driver is
shielded by discretionary immunity.56 Similarly, courts which focus
on the language of drunk driving statutes that do not mandate de-
tention of drunk drivers also label the officer's act discretionary, and
thus immune from liability. 57
51 Id. However, the officer is not entitled to total immunity in the arrest context;
police discretionary immunity does not shield officers from liability for false arrest. Id.
n.22.
52 See Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 669 P.2d 451 (Wash. 1983) (the decision
to dispatch an officer to the scene of a crime or to investigate a crime does not involve a
basic policy judgment which would render the government immune from suit).
53 Jackson v. Kansas City, 680 P.2d 877 (Kan. 1984).
54 Critics of the discretionary-ministerial function distinction find that the distinc-
tion is too easily manipulated. See Jaffe, supra note 40, at 218:
The dichotomy between 'ministerial' and 'discretionary' i[s] at the least
unclear, and one may suspect that it is a way of stating rather than arriv-
ing at the result. One may also believe that it has become a convenient
device for extending the area of nonliability without making the reasons
explicit.
55 See Shore v. Town of Stonington, 444 A.2d 1379 (Conn. 1982); Everton v. Wil-
lard, 468 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1985); Jones v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning
Comm'n, 571 A.2d 859 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990); Schutte v. Sitton, 729 S.W.2d 208
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
56 See infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
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Because the police must be free to make arrest decisions with-
out fear of liability, some courts have characterized the duty to de-
tain a drunk driver as discretionary, insulating the government from
liability for an officer's negligent failure to prevent a drunk driver
from driving.58 In Everton v. Willard,5 9 a sheriff's deputy stopped an
intoxicated driver for a traffic violation. The deputy knew6° that the
driver had been drinking, yet failed to take any measures to prevent
him from driving.61 Minutes later, the driver was involved in an ac-
cident, killing one person and seriously injuring another.62 The
families of the injured and deceased brought suit against the driver,
the deputy, the sheriff's office, and the county.63 The trial court
dismissed the complaint against all parties except for the driver.
The Supreme Court of Florida upheld the dismissal because
the decision of whether to enforce the law by making an arrest is a
basic judgmental or discretionary governmental function that is
immune from suit .... This discretionary power is considered
basic to the police power function of governmental entities and is
recognized as critical to a law enforcement officer's ability to carry
out his duties.64
The court found that, like a judge's decision regarding sentencing
or a prosecutor's decision to prosecute, the officer's decision to
arrest is discretionary and as a result, the officer is immune from
liability.65
When a drunk driving statute does not specifically require po-
lice officers to arrest or detain drunk drivers, a court may find that
the officer's duty is not mandatory. In Hildenbrand v. Cox, 6 6 a police
officer investigated a driver who had collided with a flower pot in
the town square. 67 Although the driver told the officer that he had
drunk a few beers, and the officer noticed beer cans in the driver's
58 See Shore, 444 A.2d 1379 (if the police are held liable for failure to make an arrest,
police will be forced to choose between potential liability for false arrest and potential
liability for failure to arrest); Fusilier v. Russell 345 So. 2d 543 (La. Ct. App.) (officers
are faced with a dilemma between being sued for damages for false arrest, on the one
hand, and for damages from failure to arrest on the other), cert. denied, 347 So. 2d 261
(La. Ct. App. 1977).
59 468 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1985).
60 The Everton court's opinion states that "[t]he deputy recognized, from his own
observations and Willard's admission, that Willard had been drinking to some extent."
IM. at 937.
61 Id. at 937.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 937, 938.
65 Id. at 939.
66 369 N.W.2d 411 (Iowa 1985).
67 Id. at 412-13.
1992] 883
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
car,68 the officer permitted the individual to drive away. 69 Shortly
thereafter, the driver was killed in another collision.70 The driver's
estate sued the officer and the city, alleging that the officer was neg-
ligent in allowing the driver to continue driving. The court recon-
gized that the driver was intoxicated at the time of the investigation
and the subsequent fatal collision, but held that neither the officer
nor the city was liable.7 1 Because the state statutes regarding drunk
driving and public drunkenness state that the officer "may" arrest
the individual or take him into custody, the court found that the
legislature did not intend to prescribe mandatory conduct.72 Thus,
the officer had no duty to arrest the driver, and by failing to arrest
him, the officer had committed no tort.73
b. Ministerial Acts: Liability
A number of courts have determined that the duty to arrest a
drunk driver is not discretionary: police have a mandatory duty to
prevent an intoxicated person from driving.74 That is not to say that
the police have an obligation to stop and arrest every individual who
may be driving drunk, but once an officer believes or has reason to
believe that an individual is intoxicated and intends to drive in that
state, the officer has a mandatory duty to prevent that individual
from driving. Courts advocating this view usually focus on whether
the police department has provided specific guidelines requiring an
officer to detain a drunk driver,75 or whether the drunk driving stat-
ute itself authorizes or requires officers to remove drunk drivers
from the road.76
When the police officer is provided with specific guidelines re-
garding intoxicated individuals, the court may find that the officer's
duty to detain is not discretionary. In Fudge v. City of Kansas City,77
two police officers observed the intoxicated condition of an individ-
ual, but failed to prevent the individual from getting into his car and
driving away.78 Shortly thereafter, the individual caused an accident
68 Id. at 414.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 416.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See Ransom v. City of Garden City, 743 P.2d 70 (Idaho 1987); Irwin v. Town of
Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (Mass. 1984); Fudge v. City of Kansas City, 720 P.2d 1093 (Kan.
1986); Bailey v. Town of Forks, 737 P.2d 1257 (Wash. 1987).
75 See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
76 See infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
77 720 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1986).
78 Id. at 1097.
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in which a man was killed.79 The decedent's family brought an ac-
tion against the drunk driver and Kansas City. At trial, the court
found the City and police officers partially liable for the death of the
decedent.80 On appeal, the City and the police claimed that the of-
ficers' actions fell within an exception to the liability imposed in the
discretionary immunity section of Kansas Tort Claims Act.8' The
court found that the duty to detain a drunk driver was not discre-
tionary and did not fall within this exception because "the City [had]
adopted a specific mandatory set of guidelines for police officers. to
use with regard to handling intoxicated persons. The guidelines left
no discretion." '8 2
When a state legislature has enacted laws that require or even
just authorize an officer to take an intoxicated driver into custody, a
court may find that the officer's decision to detain the driver is not
discretionary. 83 For example, Irwin v. Town of Ware84 involved an
auto accident caused by an intoxicated driver who two officers had
pulled over earlier. The officers knew that the driver had been
drinking, yet they failed to conduct a sobriety test and permitted the
driver to continue driving.8 5 Ten minutes later, the intoxicated
driver was involved in a collision, killing the intoxicated driver, and
the driver and one passenger in the other car.8 6 Two other passen-
gers suffered severe injuries.8 7 The court held that the officers' de-
cision to detain the drunk driver was not discretionary. Under the
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, like the Kansas Tort Claims Act, the
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(e) (1989) (immunizing the government from lia-
bility for "any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or em-
ployee, whether or not the discretion be abused.").
82 Fudge, 720 P.2d at 1100. The General Order which set out the procedures for
handling intoxicated individuals provided: " 'An individual, male orfemale, who is inca-
pacitated by alcohol or drugs, and because of such condition, is likely to do physical
injury to himself or herself or others if allowed to remain at liberty will be taken into
protective custody and processed in the following manner. . ." Id. at 1098 (quoting
General Order 79-44).
83 See Weldy v. Town of Kingston, 514 A.2d 1257 (N.H. 1986) (failure to arrest
teenage driver who had alcohol in vehicle created cause of action against officials and
town because statute required that police officer "shall arrest" any driver illegally trans-
porting alcohol). See also Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 163-64 (Colo. 1986) (If an intoxi-
cated person is not driving, the decision by police officer to take that person into custody
is discretionary; but "[w]hen a police officer stops a person he knows, or reasonably
should know, is driving under the influence, the officer arguably has no discretion but to
arrest the suspect.").
84 467 N.E.2d 1292 (Mass. 1984).
85 Id. at 1304-05.
86 Id.
87 Id.
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state retains immunity for discretionary acts by public employees.8 8
The court concluded, however, that the decision of an officer to de-
tain a driver, whom the officer knows or should know is intoxicated,
is not a discretionary act because a discretionary act is " 'character-
ized by the high degree of discretion and judgment involved in
weighing alternatives and making choices with respect to public pol-
icy and planning.' "89 According to the court, an officer's decision
to remove a drunk driver from the road is not a "policy or planning
judgment." 90 The court stated that by enacting a statute authoriz-
ing police to arrest drunk drivers, the legislature had already made
the policy or planning decision to remove drunk drivers from the
road.91
B. The Public Duty Doctrine
The other potential source of governmental immunity for negli-
gent failure to detain drunk drivers is the public duty doctrine. This
doctrine provides that because the government owes some unspeci-
fied duties to the general public, but not to any individual person, it
is immune from liability for torts committed by a public official
absent a special duty owed to the injured citizen.92 The rule
originated as a common-law doctrine in the 19th century93 and was
first recognized by the Supreme Court in South v. Maryland.94 In
1879, the doctrine was described:
The rule of official responsibility, then, appears to be this: That if
the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a
duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or
erroneous performance, must be a public, not an individual in-
jury, and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public pros-
ecution. On the other hand, if the duty is a duty to the individual,
then a neglect to perform it, or to perform it properly, is an indi-
88 See supra note 44 for the relevant provisions of the Massachusetts Tort Claims
Act.
89 Imin, 467 N.E.2d at 1298 (quoting Whitney v. City of Worcester, 366 N.E.2d
1210, 1210 (Mass. 1977)).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, § 131, at 1049 n.81;John Cameron Mc-
Millan, Jr., Government Liability and the Public Duty Doctrine, 32 VILL. L. REv. 505 (1987);
Sellers, supra note 33, at 322-23; Walker, supra note 33, at 675.
93 Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 155 n.6 (Colo. 1986). See McMillan, supra note 92,
at 509; Walker, supra note 33, at 60 n.60.
94 59 U.S. 396 (1855). In South, the plaintiff sued the local sheriff for failing to
enforce the laws of the State and protect the plaintiff who had been kidnapped. The
plaintiff asserted that the sheriff knew that the plaintiff had been kidnapped and yet did
nothing to obtain his release. Id. at 398-99. The Supreme Court held that the sheriff's
duty to keep the peace was "a public duty, for neglect of which he is amenable to the
public, and punishable by indictment only." Id. at 403.
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vidual wrong, and may support an individual action for
damages. 95
A majority of jurisdictions rely on the public duty doctrine to
shield public officers and their government employers from liability
for negligent actions.96 Unlike discretionary act immunity, the doc-
trine theoretically is not an immunity barring any governmental tort
liability. However, in effect, the public duty doctrine does immunize
government entities from liability for an individual's injury because
government owes a duty to the public in general, and not to individ-
ual plaintiffs, as in the case of police and fire protection.97
This doctrine has been widely criticized on the ground that it
"results in a duty to none where there is a duty to all." 98 A growing
number of cases support the expanding view that the doctrine is an
"unwarranted judicial invocation of a sovereign immunity suppos-
edly abolished by prior statutory law." 99 As a result, it has been
eroded by judicial decisions which have narrowed its scope l°° or re-
jected it altogether.10 '
95 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 379 (1879), quoted in
Leake, 720 P.2d at 155 n.6.
96 McMillan, supra note 92, at 512. See, e.g., Lehto v. City of Oxnard, 217 Cal. Rptr.
450 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Fisher v. District of Columbia, 498 A.2d 198 (D.C. 1985);
Fessler v. R.E.J., Inc., 514 N.E.2d 515 (I11. App. 1986); Barratt v. Burlingham, 492 A.2d
1219 (R.I. 1985).
97 Sellers, supra note 33, at 323 (the public duty doctrine "has been the principle
tool to deny relief in negligent [fire] inspection cases").
98 Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1015 (Fla.
1979)(holding that because the public duty doctrine was a function of sovereign immu-
nity, it did not survive the abrogation of sovereign immunity).
99 Sellers, supra note 33, at 323-24. In Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1015, the
court held that the public duty doctrine was "a function of municipal sovereign immu-
nity and... its efficacy is dependent on the continuing vitality of the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity." The court further stated that the public duty doctrine did not survive
the enactment of the state statute abrogating absolute governmental immunity. Id. Sim-
ilarly, in Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241-42 (Alaska 1976), the court
consider[ed] that the 'duty to all, duty to no-one doctrine' is in reality a
form of sovereign immunity, which is a matter dealt with by statute in
Alaska, and not to be amplified by court-created doctrine.... To allow
the public duty doctrine to disturb this equality would create immunity
where the legislature has not.
100 Courts have narrowed the public duty doctrine by creating the "special relation-
ship" exception discussed infra at notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
101 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, § 131, at 1049. The public duty doctrine
has been abolished in the following states: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Iowa,
New Mexico, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235
(Alaska 1976) ("mhe 'duty to all, duty to no-one' doctrine is in reality a form of sover-
eign immunity, which is a matter dealt with by statute in Alaska, and not to be amplified
by court-created doctrine."); Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 616 (Ariz. 1982) ("We shall no
longer engage in the speculative exercise of determining whether the tort-feasor has a
general duty to the injured party, which spells no recovery, or if he had a specific indi-
vidual duty which means recovery."); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986) ("In our
view, the problems associated with the public duty rule far outweigh the benefits of the
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1. The Public Duty Doctrine: A Tool to Deny Police Liability in
Failure to Arrest Cases
Under the pure form of the public duty doctrine, an officer's
duty to arrest is a duty owed to the public in general, and therefore
no individual may sue for an officer's failure to perform that duty.
In Schutte v. Sitton,' °2 a police officer knowingly permitted an individ-
ual to get into his vehicle and drive in an intoxicated condition.103
Shortly thereafter, the victim was killed in an accident caused by the
intoxicated driver's negligence.10 4 Plaintiffs brought a wrongful
death action against the city and the police officer.10 5 On appeal,
the court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the action.' 0 6 The
court stated that under Missouri law, "public officers are not liable
for injuries or damages sustained by particular individuals resulting
from-breach by the officers of a duty owed to the general public."' 0 7
The court held that because the officer's duty to prevent the intoxi-
cated individual from driving was a duty owed to the general public,
the officer and the city were immune from liability to individual
plaintiffs for breaching this duty.'08
rule, which are more properly realized by other means."); Commercial Carrier Corp. v.
Indian River Co., 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979) (holding that the public duty doctrine is
dependent on the sovereign immunity doctrine and did not survive Florida's tort claims
act); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979) (holding that "the abrogation of
sovereign immunity means the same principles of liability apply to officers and employ-
ees of municipalities as to any other tort defendants, except as expressly modified or
limited by the provisions of [the Iowa statute imposing liability on municipalities for
their employees torts committed while acting within scope of their employment]");
Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs, 687 P.2d 728 (N.M. 1984) ("The Tort Claims Act
abolished the 'public duty-special duty' distinction in this jurisdiction."); Brennen v.
City of Eugene, 591 P.2d 719 (Or. 1979) ("[A]ny distinction between "public" and "pri-
vate" duty is precluded by statute of this state."); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 247
N.W.2d 132 (Wis. 1976) ("Any duty owed to the public generally is a duty owed to
individual members of the public."); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986Y ("The
public-duty/special-duty rule was in essence a form of sovereign immunity... [which]
[t]he legislature has abolished. The public duty only rule, if it ever was recognized in
Wyoming, is no longer viable.").
102 729 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
'03 Id. at 209.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 210 (citing Lawhon v. City of Smithville, 715 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986); Cox v. Department of Natural Resources, 699 S.W.2d 443, 449 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985); Jamierson v. Dale, 670 S.W.2d 195, 196 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)).
108 Id. at 211. The Missouri courts do not recognize a "special duty" exception to
the public duty doctrine. Id. The court held that under the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior, if the officer is immune from liability, so is his employer. Id. Missouri is the only
state which uses the public duty doctrine in its pure form without the "special relation-
ship exception." Walker, supra note 38, at 680.
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2. The Special Relationship/Special Duty Exception to the Public
Duty Doctrine
Most jurisdictions that continue to use the public duty doctrine
have narrowed its scope by creating a "special relationship" or
"special duty" exception to the immunity rule. 10 9 Generally, a spe-
cial relationship is created when the government singles out an indi-
vidual or group for special treatment." 0 Courts vary as to which
situations create a special relationship."I Most commonly, a special
relationship exists when a citizen collaborates with the police and is
109 Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 159 (CQlo. 1986); McMillan, supra note 92, at 330-
31; Sellers, supra note 33, at 680; Walker, supra note 33, at 514. That the "no duty" rule
creates harsh results for injured plaintiffs may have played a role in the creation of ex-
ceptions to the public duty doctrine. Bailey v. Town of Forks, 737 P.2d 1257, 1260
(1987), modified, 753 P.2d 523 (Wash. 1988).
110 Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 669 P.2d 451,458-59 (Wash. 1983)(finding
a special relationship between plaintiffs who had called the police department for help
and the police assured them that help was on the way).
In Bailey, 737 P.2d 1257, a city police officer had been in contact with an individual
who he knew or should have known was intoxicated. Id. at 1258. Nevertheless, the
officer ordered the individual to leave the area and watched him enter his truck. Id.
Shortly thereafter, the intoxicated driver caused an accident which resulted in plaintiff
Bailey suffering serious injury. Id. After finding that police officer's 'decisions in the
field are not "discretionary policymaking decisions" immune from suit, the court ana-
lyzed the officer's behavior under the public duty doctrine. Id. The court defined four
situations which require a special duty to a particular plaintiff:
1. when the terms of a legislative enactment evidence an intent to iden-
tify and protect a particular and circumscribed dass of persons (legis-
lative intent);
2. where governmental agents responsible for enforcing statutory re-
quirements possess actual knowledge of a statutory violation, fail to
take corrective action despite a statutory duty to do so, and the plain-
tiff is within the class the statute intended to protect (failure to
enforce);
3. when governmental agents fail to exercise reasonable care after as-
suming a duty to warn or come to the aid of a particular plaintiff (res-
cue doctrine); or
4. where a relationship exists between the governmental agent and any
reasonably foreseeable plaintiff, setting the injured plaintiff off from
the general public and the plaintiff relies on explicit assurances given
by the agent or assurances inherent in a duty vested in a governmental
entity (a special relationship).
Id. at 1260 (citations omitted). Because the officer had a duty to take intoxicated individ-
uals into custody, the court found that the failure-to-enforce exception was met and
traditional tort principles must be applied to determine whether the officer and the town
were liable for plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 1260-61. The court said, "[w]hen statutes in-
tend to insure the safety of the public highways, a governmental officer's knowledge of
an actual violation creates a duty of care to all persons and property who come within
the ambit of the risk created by the officer's negligent conduct." Id. at 1261 (citations
omitted).
11I See Note, Police Liability for Negligent Failure to Prevent Crime, 94 HARv. L. REv. 821,
825-27 (1981). Courts have expanded the special relationship exception, creating five
categories of cases where a special relationship may be found:
1. cases in which the plaintiff is harmed as a consequence of his abetting
the police, often as an informer or witness;
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placed in danger due to this collaboration, '1 2 or when the police
promise to protect an individual.' 1 3
In addition, courts have recognized special relationships in
other situations and their findings depend largely on the specific
facts of the case and public policy concerns." 14 For example, when
the police are aware of a narrowly defined and identifiable source of
danger to the public which a statute or ordinance seeks to prevent, a
court may find a special relationship even though the police could
not foresee a specific plaintiff." 5 An officer's- failure to detain a
drunk driver falls within this category of special relationships.
Courts are divided, however, on the question of whether a special
relationship has been created when a police officer negligently fails
to prevent a drunk driver from proceeding.
a. No Special Relationship/Special Duty Created
Some courts have found that when an officer negligently fails to
arrest an intoxicated driver, no special relationship is created and
the public duty doctrine effectively shields the officer from liabil-
2. cases where the police extend express promises of protection to spe-
cific individuals;
3. cases where the police are aware of a danger to a specific individual,
but have neither jeopardized the plaintiff through their affirmative acts
nor promised him protection;
4. cases where the police are aware of a narrowly defined and readily
identifiable source of danger to the public, but cannot reasonably fore-
see a specific victim;
5. cases where the police fail to provide protection from ainore general
threat, such as a "crime wave."
Id. Courts, however, are highly unlikely to find a special relationship in the last two
categories. Id. 1
112 See Estate of Tanasijevich v. City of Hammond, 383 N.E.2d 1081, 1083 (Ind.
1978) (finding a special relationship when a citizen cooperated with police and his prop-
erty was later damaged in retaliation); Christy v. City of Baton Rouge, 282 So. 2d 724,
727 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (police owe duty to protect assault victim attacked while aiding
police in arrest); Schuster v. City of New York, 154 N.E.2d 534, 537 (N.Y. 1958) (al-
lowing the plaintiff, whose son had given the police information leading to the arrest of a
murder suspect, to recover damages).
113 See Morgan v. Yuba County, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (failure
to give promised warning of the impending release of dangerous person); Silverman v.
City of Fort Wayne, 357 N.E.2d 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (police promise to protect
plaintiff's property could create duty of protection).
114 See Note, supra note 111; Walker, supra note 33, at 682-84.
115 See Irwin v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (Mass. 1984), discussed supra notes
84-91 and accompanying text, infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text; Bailey v. Town
of Forks, 737 P.2d 1257 (Wash. 1987), discussed supra note 110. See also Campbell v.
City of Bellevue, 530 P.2d 234 (Wash. 1975) (city ordinance created special duty for city
electrical inspector to disconnect hazardous electrical system).
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ity.116 In Fessler v. R.E.J., Inc.,1 17 after several complaints of reckless
driving, a police officer located the vehicle parked in a lot and spoke
with the driver. 18 The officer, however, did not perform any sobri-
ety test and allowed the driver to stay with the vehicle. 119 Approxi-
mately an hour later, the intoxicated driver's vehicle collided with
another vehicle in which both the driver and passenger were
killed.120 Although the court recognized the special duty exception
to the public duty doctrine, it found that the exception did not apply
in this case because the plaintiffs did not allege that "plaintiffs' dece-
dents were injured while under the direct and immediate control of
Sergeant Pickett and the city ofJerseyville."' 21 Thus, the court re-
fused to recognize any special relationship exception to the public
duty doctrine unless the police had control over the plaintiffs. As a
result, the government had no duty to protect those injured due to
the officer's negligence.
b. Special Relationship/Special Duty Created
Alternatively, some courts have found that a special relation-
ship is created when an officer negligently fails to detain an intoxi-
cated driver. 122 In Irwin v. Town of Ware,' 28 the court stated that
several categories of special relationships, based largely on a uni-
form set of considerations, exist in the common law. 124 The most
116 See Everton v. Willard, 468 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1985); Fessler v. R.EJ., Inc., 514
N.E.2d 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 510 A.2d 1078 (Md.
1986);Jones v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 571 A.2d 859 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1990); Crosby v. Town of Bethlehem, 457 N.Y.S.2d 618 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982); Barratt v. Burlingham, 492 A.2d 1219 (R.I. 1985).
117 514 N.E.2d 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
118 1d at 517.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 519.
121 Id. According to the court, four elements must be met for the exception to
apply:
1. [Ihe municipality must be uniquely aware of the particular danger or
risk to which the plaintiff is exposed;
2. there must be allegations of specific acts or omissions on the part of
the municipality;
3. the specific acts or omissions on the part of the municipal employees
must be either affirmative or wilful in nature; and
4. the injury must occur while the plaintiff is under the direct and immediate
control of employees or agents of the municipality.
Id. (citations omitted). The court focused on the fourth element, which was not met,
"assuming the plaintiffs here have alleged facts sufficient to establish the first three re-
quirements of the exception." Id.
122 See Fudge v. City of Kansas City, 720 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1986); Irwin v. Town of
Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (Mass. 1984); Bailey v. Town of Forks, 737 P.2d 1257 (Wash.
1987).
123 467 N.E.2d 1292 (Mass. 1984). For a discussion of the facts involved in Irwin,
see supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
124 Id. at 1300.
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important of these considerations is "whether a defendant reason-
ably could foresee that he would be expected to take affirmative ac-
tion to protect the plaintiff and could anticipate harm to the plaintiff
from the failure to do so."125 The court also placed heavy emphasis
on legislative intent to protect a specific class, such as those who a
drunk driver may injure. 12 6 Based on foreseeability and legislative
intent, the court concluded that a special relationship exists between
an officer who negligently fails to remove a drunk driver from the
road and a third party who is injured by the drunk driver.' 27
3. Abolishment of the Public Duty Doctrine
A growing number of courts are abolishing the public duty doc-
trine in all contexts because they have concluded that the doctrine's
purposes are better served by traditional tort principles and the pro-
tection provided by sovereign immunity statutes. 28
In the context of failure to arrest drunk driver cases, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court abrogated the public duty doctrine in Leake v.
Cain.129 In Leake, officers had detained a drunk individual at a party,
but later released the individualwho was to be driven home by his
seventeen year-old brother.1 30 The drunk individual later drove the
vehicle and struck six persons on the street, killing two of them.' 3'
In response to the action filed against the driver, the officers, and
the city, the court abolished the public duty doctrine in Colorado
because it "creates needless confusion in the law and results in une-
ven and inequitable results in practice." 32 The court stated that the
effect of the doctrine was the same as that of sovereign immunity,
which had been abrogated in the state.1 33 It further stated that the
legislature, which had enacted a statute instructing courts to resolve
claims against the government without regard to public status, could
not have intended to protect the government with a doctrine so sim-
ilar to sovereign immunity.' 34 The court then applied traditional
125 Id. (citations omitted).
126 Id. at 1303-04.
127 Id.
128 Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 158 (Colo. 1986). See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235
(Alaska 1976); Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 616 (Ariz. 1982); Commercial Carrier Corp. v.
Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664
(Iowa 1979); Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs, 687 P.2d 728 (N.M. 1984); Brennen
v. City of Eugene, 591 P.2d 719 (Or. 1979); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 247 N.W.2d
132 (Wis. 1976).
129 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986).
130 Id. at 154.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 159.
133 Id. at 160.
134 Id.
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tort principles and statutorily created governmental protections to
determine the liability of the officers and the city. 135
C. Two Doctrines, One Result: Governmental Immunity
In order to insulate the police and their government employers
from liability for negligent failure to detain drunk drivers, courts
have relied on two doctrines: governmental immunity for discre-
tionary acts and the public duty doctrine. By labelling an officer's
decision not to detain a drunk driver as discretionary, courts place
this conduct within a .category of government conduct which is im-
mune from liability in every state.13 6 Similarly, courts may charac-
terize an officer's duty to detain 'a drunk driver as a public duty
which, absent a "special relationship" between the officer and the
plaintiff, makes the government immune from liability to any indi-
vidual.13 7 Whether these courts apply the public duty doctrine or
the discretionary immunity doctrine, the result is the same: the gov-
ernment is immunized from liability when a police officer's negli-
gent conduct results in the injury or death of a victim.
Neither principle nor policy justifies the invocation of artificial
barriers to exonerate the government from liability. Although some
courts have rejected these barriers and denied governmental immu-
nity, the following section argues that no courts should shield the
government from liability for negligent failure to detain drunk
drivers.
II
ANALYSIS
By characterizing the duty to detain a drunk driver as a
mandatory duty and by finding a special relationship exception to
the public duty doctrine, some courts have not erected artificial bar-
riers to governmental liability for failure to detain drunk drivers.' 3 8
These courts recognize that shielding the government from liability
lacks justification. First, neither discretionary act immunity nor the
i35 The court found that the officer and city were immune under the discretionary
function exception to the state tort claims act because the legislature intended for of-
ficers to exercise discretion in deciding whether to take into custody an intoxicated indi-
vidual who had not been driving. Although the court did not resolve the question of
whether an officer has a mandatory duty to arrest a person suspected of drunk driving,
the court implied that if the officer was acting under a drunk driving statute like in Irwin,
the officer's duty would not have been discretionary: "[wihen a police officer stops a
person he knows, or should know, is driving under the influence, the officer arguably has
no discretion but to arrest the suspect." Leake, 720 P.2d at 163-64.
136 See supra notes 54-73 and accompanying text.
137 See supra notes 92-121 and accompanying text.
138 See supra note 17 (cases rejecting the public duty doctrine and discretionary im-
munity to create governmental liability for failure to detain drunk drivers).
1992] 893
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
public duty doctrine protects the, government from liability when an
officer knows a driver is drunk and fails to deter that driver. Second,
policy concerns require that the government be liable in this con-
text. Specifically, the tort goals of compensation and deterrence,
and the public policy concerns surrounding the devastating effects
of drunk driving require governmental liability in this area. Tradi-
tional tort principles are sufficient to protect government interests
without denying immunity where warranted. Therefore, no court
should deny an injured plaintiff compensation for the government's
negligent failure to prevent an intoxicated individual from driving.
A. Neither Discretionary Act Immunity nor the Public Duty
Doctrine Protects the Government
1. Detaining an Intoxicated Driver is Not a Discretionary Act
By insulating the government from liability for an officer's deci-
sion not to detain an apparently intoxicated driver, courts distort
the intent of the discretionary act immunity. This immunity only
protects the government from liability for its agents' acts that in-
volve weighing alternatives and making policy choices.13 9 The deci-
sion to detain a driver the officer knows is intoxicated is not
discretionary.
This is not to say that all decisions made by an officer in the
field should be subject to judicial review. Discretion is a necessary
element of police law enforcement,' 40 and police decisions that re-
quire consideration of many facts and policies, such as the decision
whether to arrest an individual suspected of burglary or to stop one
particular motorist out of many,' 4 ' should not be subject to negli-
gence review. 142 To enforce the law effectively, an officer must ex-
ercise discretion to arrest or to choose another alternative as his
judgment at the time dictates.' 43 It would be unfair to subject these
139 See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
140 KENNETH C. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 140-41 (1975). Davis argues that,
although discretion is necessary for law enforcement, excessive and unnecessary discre-
tion must be eliminated and necessary discretion controlled.
141 See Everton v. Willard, 468 So. 2d 936, 939 (Fla. 1985) (Ehrlich, J., dissent-
ing)(describing the decision to choose to pull a motorist over as an allocation-of-re-
sources strategy that is a discretionary exercise of police authority).
142 See MICHAEL R. GOTIFREDSON & DON M. GOTTFREDSON, DECISIONMAKING IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: TOWARD THE RATIONAL EXERCISE OF DISCRETION 64-78 (1980) (dis-
cussing the necessity of discretion in the decision to arrest).
143 Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979)
("operational" activities can involve policy decisions). In making the decision to arrest,
an officer has a few moments to consider a variety of goals, such as the classic aims of the
criminal law (desert, incapacitation, treatment, and deterence) along with the requisites
of practicality, personal utility, and efficiency. GorrFREDSON & GOTrFREDSON, supra note
142. at 66.
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difficult decisions to post hoc review. Such review could not take into
account either the factual situation confronted by an officer or his
training and experience. Thus, the valid concerns of fairness and
effective law enforcement require that no liability attach to an of-
ficer's discretionary acts.
Courts should not, however, insulate local governments from
liability for those police actions which do not require discretion. Ef-
fective law enforcement does not require that an officer have a
choice of actions once he has encountered a driver whom the officer
knows is intoxicated. The decision to detain is simple because of
the lack of alternatives; the officer must prevent that individual from
driving. By enacting drunk driving statutes, the legislature has al-
ready made the policy decision to remove drunk drivers from the
road.144 Because the duty to detain a drunk driver is not discretion-
ary, subjecting an officer's negligent disregard of that duty to tort
review does not compromise fairness concerns or effective law
enforcement.145
Opponents of this position argue that imposing liability will de-
crease the effectiveness of law enforcement because, in order to
function properly, the police must not fear tort liability. 146 In most
144 See Irwin v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292, 1299 (Mass. 1984) ("No reasonable
basis exists for arguing that a police officer is making a policy or planning judgment in
deciding whether to remove from the roadways a driver who he knows is intoxicated.
Rather, the policy and planning decision to remove such driver has already been made
by the Legislature."); Everton, 468 So. 2d at 947 (Shaw, J., dissenting) ("Once an intoxi-
cated driver is apprehended, the obvious intent of the legislature is first to immediately
remove the intoxicated driver from the highway where he poses an imminent danger to
the public safety .... ).
145 Because the definition of a discretionary act is vague, courts, such as the Florida
Supreme Court in Everton, expand the definition to encompass the officer's judgment
whether to arrest a drunk driver in order to protect the officer and his government em-
ployer from liability. However, this distorts the original intent of the discretionary act
immunity which was to protect government entities from liability for policy judgments.
Everton, 468 So. 2d at 940 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
146 See Fessler v. R.EJ., Inc., 514 N.E.2d 515, 522 (Ill. 1987):
[I]t should be remembered that efficient law enforcement necesarily in-
volves a grant of broad discretion to police officers in determining
whether to restrain, detain, or arrest an individual. This discretion is re-
quired by the facts that there are often numerous matters deserving of a
police officer's attention at the same time, and it is often impractical for
police officers to consult with their superiors in order to arrange their
priorities.
(citation omitted); Everton, 468 So. 2d at 949 (Shaw,J., dissenting) (addressing the argu-
ment that "denying immunity for the discretionary acts of police officers will 'chill' the
officers in the performance of their duties."); Jones v. Maryland-National Capital Park &
Planning Comm'n, 571 A.2d 859, 869 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990):
When performing the job of a law enforcement officer, the exercise of
discretion may call for decisiveness and action in response to crises. A
police officer's presently difficult job would be nearly impossible if every
act committed in a non-malicious, discretionary manner could become
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states, however, the individual police officer is exempted from per-
sonal liability unless he has acted, maliciously, wantonly and will-
fully, or in bad faith.147 Thus, officers do not have to fear personal
liability and are not unduly inhibited by the prospect that their gov-
ernment employers will have to bear the financial responsibility for
the officers' negligent acts.1 48
Opponents of government liability also contend that the judici-
ary should not review officers' decisions made in the field under
high pressure circumstances.149 However, courts already review po-
lice behavior to protect the constitutional rights of the accused.' 50
Similarly, courts should be able to review an officer's decision to
release a drunk driver and should also grant injured plaintiffs the
right to seek redress for their injuries.' 5 '
-the basis of a lawsuit. Were that to occur, we would in effect be placing
handcuffs on the officers, not the culprits.
(quoting Boyer v. State, 560 A.2d 48, 50 (Md. 1989) (citations omitted). See also George
A. Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1175,
1179 ("[I]t seems that the courts are troubled chiefly by the danger of bridling the free
exercise ofjudgment by public officials."); Jaffe, supra note 40, at 223 ("A second reason
[for discretionary immunity] is that if the officer is answerable, he may hesitiate to do
what should be done .... ").
147 In Florida, for example, police officers are exempt from liability unless they act in
bad faith, with malicious intent, or with wanton and willful disregard for the rights of
others. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(9)(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1992). In Arizona, officers
are also immune from personal liability for the performance of acts done in good faith
without wanton disregard of their statutory duties. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-621(H)
(1992). In Idaho, officers are exempt from personal liability if the challenged act does
not involve malice or criminal intent and is within the scope of employment. IDAHO
CODE § 6-903(d) (1990 & Supp. 1991). In Massachusetts, the state will provide legal
representation for and indemnify police officers for claims against the officer provided
the officer acted within the scope of his employment and did not act in a "wilful, wanton
or malicious manner." MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 258, § 9A (Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp.
1991). See also CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 825-825.6 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. PUB.
OFFICERS LAw § 17 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1992) (1990 & Supp. 1991); OR. REv.
STAT. § 30.285 (1988).
148 Ransom v. City of Garden City, 743 P.2d 70, 73 (Idaho 1987) ("[W]e do not
believe police officers in the field will be unduly inhibited by the prospect that the gov-
ernmental entity might eventually bear the financial responsibility for compensating
those who have been injured by the negligent acts of officers").
149 See id. (addressing the policy against the court determining the propriety of a
decision by a coordinate branch of government); Everton v. Willard, 468 So. 2d 936,
949 (Fla. 1985) (Shaw, J., dissenting) (addressing the argument that "judges and juries,
in the later tranquility of the courtroom, cannot be permitted to 'second guess' the deci-
sions of police officers made under the stress and strain of the 'street world' with its
conflicting demands and dangers."). See also Jaffe, supra note 40, at 223 ("The first [basis
for the discretionary function exception] is the injustice, particularly in the absence of
bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is required by law to exercise discre-
tion."); Note, supra note 111, at 832 ("Central to the discretion argument is the conten-
tion that courts lack the requisite expertise to review police actions.").
150 See Everton, 468 So. 2d at 949 (Shaw, J., dissenting). Courts also review police
conduct in tort claims for false arrest and § 1983 claims of misconduct. Note, supra note
111, at 832.
151 Everton, 468 So. 2d at 949 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
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By refusing to label a police officers negligent failure to detain a
drunk driver as discretionary, the Kansas Supreme Court in Fudge
and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Irwin properly
interpreted the discretionary-ministerial act distinction. Only dis-
cretionary acts are protected and the decision to detain an individ-
ual an officer knows is intoxicated is by no means discretionary.
Thus, the discretionary act doctrine does not protect the govern-
ment from liability in these circumstances. For courts, such as
those in Everton and Hilderbrand, to label such an act as discretionary
is a misinterpretation of the doctrine.
2. When an Officer Knows a Driver Is Intoxicated a "Special
Relationship" Is Created
Short of abrogating -the public duty doctrine,15 2 courts should
acknowledge that when a police officer knows an individual has or
will be driving in an intoxicated condition, a "special relationship"
is created. The knowledge of a driver's intoxicated state is the basis
of the government's unique ability to prevent harm to third parties.
It is this knowledge which creates the special duty to prevent that
driver from causing harm to other citizens.153 In Irwin, the court
stated that the government's duty to protect is based on foreseeabil-
ity of harm to citizens arising from government inaction. 154 Because
the officer knew, or should have known, that the individual was in-
toxicated, he should have foreseen the potential injuries to third
parties. Thus, he had a duty to prevent that harm. Failure to take
preventive measures breaches that duty and, as a result, the govern-
ment is liable.
When an officer knows of the intoxicated condition of a driver,
the officer has a special duty to prevent the harm that might be in-
flicted upon third parties if the officer fails to act. Therefore, even if
the public duty doctrine is retained, courts should apply the special
duty exception in these cases.
152 Ideally, the public duty doctrine should be abolished. See infra notes 183-87 and
accompanying text.
153 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 302(B) (1964):
An act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through
the conduct of the other or a third person which is intended to cause
harm, even though such conduct is criminal (emphasis added).
154 467 N.E.2d 1292, 1301 (Mass. 1984). The court also based the special relation-
ship exception on the legislature's intent to protect citizens from drunk drivers.
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B. Policy Concerns
1. Compensating Victims
The tort system entitles those who are injured due to the negli-
gence of another to recover their damages at the expense of the
wrongdoer.' 55 The concern for compensating tort victims has al-
ways been a powerful influence in tort law, and 156 the modern trend
focuses on this function. Courts have expanded tort liability by pro-
viding victims with access to the courts to seek-redress. In the pri-
vate sector, for example, courts have created the tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress to allow plaintiffs to recover when
they have no other damages. 157 Courts have also abrogated the de-
fense of contributory negligence which, in the past, prevented plain-
tiffs who were partially at fault from recovering. 15 8 Some courts
have even expanded the duty of landlords to include protecting ten-
ants from foreseeable criminal acts of third parties.' 59 In the public
sector, the abrogation of absolute government immunity has signifi-
cantly expanded government tort liability.' 60
Courts must give those harmed as a result of negligent failure
to detain drunk drivers an opportunity to recover from the govern-
ment. Otherwise, those harmed are forced to bear the cost alone.
To deny these victims the opportunity to seek redress for their inju-
ries is inapposite to the modern trend of expanding tort liability in
order to compensate victims.
2. Deterring Harmful Conduct
Courts are concerned not only with compensating victims but
also with deterring harmful conduct in the future.' 61 Culpable de-
fendants should be held accountable for their actions in order to
deter future negligent behavior. Once police officers know that neg-
ligent failure to detain drunk drivers may result in liability, officers
will take greater care in preventing drunk individuals from driving.
As a result, officer performance in removing drunk drivers from the
155 See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
156 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 25, § 4, at 20.
157 See Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912
(Cal. 1968); Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990); Ramirez v.
Armstrong, 673 P.2d 822 (N.M. 1983).
158 See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975); Li v. Yellow Cab
Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v.
Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886 (I1. 1981); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511
(Mich. 1979); Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234 (N.M. 1981).
159 See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 176 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Scott v.
Watson, 359 A.2d 548 (Md. 1976); Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436 (N.J. 1980).
160 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 111, at 822.
161 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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road will be enhanced. Because the police officer is in a unique po-
sition to know and prevent individuals from driving drunk, every
incentive must be provided in order to encourage officers to get
drunk drivers off the road.
Likewise, the possibility of liability will encourage government
entities to implement stricter standards in hiring, training, and su-
pervising police officers. 162 Evidence indicates that institutional re-
forms can significantly affect crime prevention.' 63 Greater care by
police officers and enhanced governmental supervision of those of-
ficers will result in fewer drunk drivers on the road.
Drunk driving causes a devastating number of injuries and
deaths every year,164 and measures that reduce the incidence of
drunk driving are necessary to combat this national crisis. Denying
governmental immunity for negligently failing to prevent a death or
injury as a result of drunk driving is a necessary factor in the nation-
wide fight against drunk driving.
3. Economic Considerations
Those opposed to such liability argue that it will cause eco-
nomic harm to the government employer by requiring it to pay dam-
age awards to injured parties.' 6 5 Such economic considerations,
however, were also relevant to the decision to abolish sovereign im-
munity-a decision which almost every state has already made, re-
gardless of the possibility of economic burden to the
government.' 66 State legislatures obviously did not intend for eco-
162 See Bermann, supra note 146, at 1195. See also Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980), in which the Supreme Court said that 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1988), which opened the door for municipal liability for tortious conduct of its employ-
ees, "was intended not only to provide compensation to the victims of past abuses, but
to serve as a deterrent against future constitutional deprivations, as well." The Court
further added:
In addition, the threat of liability against the city ought to increase the
attentiveness with which officials at the higher levels of government su-
pervise the conduct of their subordinates. The need to institute system-
wide measures in order to increase the vigilance with which otherwise
indifferent municipal officials protect citizens' constitutional rights is, of
course, particularly acute where the front line officers are judgment-proof
in their individual capacities.
Id. at 652 n.36. See also GREGORY H. WII.UAMs, THE LAW AND PoLrncs OF POUCE Dis-
CRETION 107-11 (1984) (stating that municipal liability may compel efforts by local gov-
ernments to monitor police behavior).
163 See Note, supra note I 11, at 833 (describing studies that show that department
techniques affect crime prevention).
164 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
165 See Irwin v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d at 1304 (Mass. 1984); Bailey v. Town of
Forks, 737 P.2d 1257, 1259 (Wash. 1987). See also Note, supra note 111, at 833.
166 See Irwin, 467 N.E.2d at 1304 ("[T]he Legislature, by enacting [the Massachusetts
Tort Claims Act], chose to put the public funds at risk.")
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nomic considerations to prevent every innocent plaintiff injured
through the negligence of a public official from recovering.
Additionally, state legislatures may limit adverse economic ef-
fects of state and municipality liability for police negligent failure to
detain drunk drivers. First, through the purchase of liability insur-
ance, government entities can protect themselves from the financial
burden of tort liability.' 67 Second, legislatures may statutorily limit
the maximum amount of damages awardable so that the govern-
ment unit will not suffer financial devastation as a result of tort
liability.168
The application of traditional tort principles in failure to detain
drunk drivers cases will also prevent undue financial hardship on the
government entity.169 Thus, the government will not be strictly lia-
ble for an officer's failure to arrest a drunk driver. First, there must
be a duty which is only created when a police officer stops, detains,
or observes an individual, and the officer knows or should know the
individual is intoxicated and intends to drive. Under these circum-
stances, the officer has a duty to detain the individual and perform a
sobriety test. Second, the officer must breach that duty. If the re-
sults of the sobriety test indicate that the individual is intoxicated,
the officer is required to prevent that individual from driving.
Under this analysis, injured plaintiffs would be able to recover in
cases similar to Schutte, '70 Everton, 171 and Fessler, 172 where the officer
knows that the individual is intoxicated and intends to drive in that
state but fails to conduct a sobriety test or prevent the individual
167 Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597, 598-99 (Ariz. 1982). Admittedly, some local gov-
ernments may be financially unable to acquire liability insurance; however, the policies
requiring that government entities be subject to review in tort actions are overwhelming.
Even a small municipality will be better suited financially to deal with the loss than the
individual citizen.
168 E.g. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-3 (Supp. 1990):
In any tort action against any city or town or any fire district, any damages(
recovered therein shall not exceed the sum of one hundred thousand dol-
lars ($100,000) provided, however, that in all circumstances in which said
city or town or fire district was engaged in proprietary functions in the
commission of such tort, the limitation of damages set forth in this sec-
tion shall apply.
Section 9-31-4 allows the general assembly to waive the limitation. R.I. GEN LAWS § 9-
31-4 (Supp. 1990). See also Irwin, 467 N.E.2d at 1304 ("The town's argument might be
more effective if the Legislature had not imposed a $100,000 limitation.").
169 See Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 160 (Colo. 1986) (the application of tort princi-
ples and the protection of statutory limitations of liability better serve the policies of
protecting excessive governmental liability and the prevention of "hindrance of the gov-
erning process").
170 729 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying
text.
171 468 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1985). See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
172 514 N.E.2d 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying
text.
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from driving. Under a tort analysis, such blatant disregard for the
safety of others would result in recovery for those injured.
Under traditional negligence analysis, however, it would be un-
reasonable to assert that the officer should have known that an indi-
vidual was intoxicated or that the individual intended to drive, the
government would not be liable because no duty has been breached.
In Leake v. Cain,173 the court applied traditional tort principles and
found that, because the officer had no reason to know that the intox-
icated teenager would drive, his failure to detain the teenager did
not result in liability for injuries resulting from the individuals sub-
sequent driving. 174 The result in Leake indicates that traditional tort
principles are sufficient to limit the liability of governmental units to
cases where the officer clearly knew of an individual's intoxicated
state and intent to drive .in that state.
Although concerns regarding the protection of the govern-
ment's financial stability in the face of tort liability are legitimate,
these concerns do not serve to deny compensation to those injured
as a result of a police officer's negligence in failing to detain a drunk
driver. Interests in compensating the injured and establishing more
responsive police policy outweigh the concern for the economic
protection of the government.' 75
III
RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENSURE LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT
FAILURE TO DETAIN DRUNK DRIVERS
A. Statutory Reform Mandating Arrest of Drunk Drivers
Despite the great concern about drunk driving, most statutes do
not mandate arrest of drunk drivers.' 76 Many of the statutes pro-
vide specific procedural guidelines for arresting an intoxicated
173 720 P.2d 152, 160 (Colo. 1986). See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
174 Leake, 720 P.2d at 162 (the plaintiff's cause of action failed on conventional tort
principles because "the officers had no reason to believe that [the teenager] had been
driving under the influence of alcohol or that he intended to do so in the immediate
future").
175 See Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs, 687 P.2d 728, 733-34 (N.M. 1984) (eco-
nomic burden on government entities due to abrogation of the public duty doctrine
outweighed by the advantage to society of more responsive government agencies).
176 Gregory H. Williams, Police Discretion: A Comparative Perspective, 64 IND. .J. 873,
895 (1989).
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driver 177 and specify penalties for driving while intoxicated,' 7s but,
as written, they imply that police officers have discretion in deciding
whether or not to arrest. 179 As a result, courts interpret the loose
language of these statutes to mean that the decision to detain a
drunk driver is discretionary. 180 To remedy the problem, state stat-
utes must command police to detain or arrest an individual if the
officer has probable cause to believe that the individual has been
driving while intoxicated. The statute must require mandatory en-
forcement so that courts will define the duty to arrest or detain as
mandatory and allow injured parties to recover for neglect of this
duty.181
State statutes may also be specifically written to provide for a
cause of action against an officer and his employer for failure to en-
force certain laws. In Connecticut, if police officers negligently fail
to suppress riotous assemblies, the city is liable for all injuries suf-
fered as a result of the officer's negligence.'8 2 Similarly, state legis-
177 Id. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 345.24(1) (West 1991):
Officer's actions after arrest for driving under the influence of intoxicant.
A person arrested under § 346.63(1) or (5) or an ordinance in con-
formity therewith or § 346.63(2) or (6) or 940.25, or § 940.09 where the
offense involved the use of a vehicle, may not be released until 12 hours
have elapsed from the time of his or her arrest or unless a chemical test
.• shows that there is 0.047o or less by weight of alcohol in the person's
blood or 0.04 grams or less of alcohol in 210 liters of the person's breath,
but the person may be released to his or her attorney, spouse, relative or
other responsible adult at any time after arrest.
178 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 321J.2(2)(a) (West Supp. 1991) (not mandating
arrest, but providing for mandatory two-day jail sentence for conviction of first offense).
179 See, e.g., MD. TRANSP. CODE § 16-205.2(a) (1987 & Supp. 1991) (providing that
an officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that an individual is or has been driv-
ing or attempting to drive while intoxicated, the officer "may" request that the individ-
ual submit to a breath test).
180 See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
181 A statute mandating that an officer detain a drunk driver could be written as
follows:
Purpose: To provide mandatory guidelines for police officers re-
garding drunk drivers; to prevent injuries that may be prevented by effec-
tive police action; to provide a cause of action to innocent victims should
a police officer negligently fail to prevent an intoxicated individual from
driving.
If a police officer observes, stops, or detains an individual whom the
officer suspects or should suspect is intoxicated and has been driving or
intends to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or
drugs, the officer must:
a. detain the individual;
b. administer a test to discover the alcohol content in the individ-
ual's blood;
c. if the defendant's blood alcohol content is more than .10 per-
cent, or if the individual refuses to submit to the test, the officer
must take the individual into protective custody or arrest the
individual.
182 Shore v. Town of Stonington, 444 A.2d 1379 (Conn. 1982); see CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 7-108 (West 1989):
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latures should enact statutes that specifically provide a cause of
action for third parties who are injured as a result of a police of-
ficer's negligent failure to detain a drunk driver. Such a statute will
guarantee that those who deserve compensation will have the op-
portunity to seek redress in court.
B. Abolishment of the Public Duty Doctrine
Each state should follow lead of the Colorado Supreme Court
in Leake v. Cain 183 and eight other state courts and abolish the public
duty doctrine.1 84 States abrogated the doctrine of absolute sover-
eign immunity because of the injustice to injured plaintiffs.1 85
Courts continue to impose the functional equivalent of sovereign
immunity, however, by using the public duty doctrine to shield the
public entity from liability.' 8 6 Like sovereign immunity, the public
duty doctrine shields the government from liability merely because
of the status of the wrongdoer; the doctrine protects the govern-
ment from liability when a private individual would be liable. 187
CITY OR BOROUGH LIABLE FOR DAMAGE DONE BY MOBS. Each
city and borough shall be liable for all injuiies to person or property,
including injuries causing death, when such injuries are caused by an act
of violence of any person or persons while a member of, or- acting in
concert with, any mob, riotous assembly of persons engaged in disturbing
the public peace, if such city or borough, or the police or other proper
authorities thereof, have not exercised reasonable care or diligence in the
prevention or suppression of such mob, riotous assembly or assembly en-
gaged in disturbing the public peace.
In Shore, the court refused to find the officer or the city responsible for the officer's
failure to arrest an intoxicated driver because the statutes regarding drunk driving were
not ministerial in nature. Shore, 444 A.2d at 1382. The court also stated that if Connecti-
cut had a statute analogous to § 7-108 which provided a cause of action for negligent
failure to detain drunk drivers, the plaintiff may have recovered. Id. at 1382-83. How-
ever, Connecticut had no such statute and the plaintiff had no cause of action.
183 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986).
184 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. Although when the public duty doc-
trine has been abolished, it has been done by the judiciary, state legislatures are urged
to eliminate this unjust and unfounded doctrine through statute.
185 See McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 162 A.2d 820, 830-31 (N.J. 1960):
It is almost incredible that in this modem age of comparative sociological
enlightenment, and in a republic, the medieval absolutism supposed to
be implicit in the maxim, 'the King can do no wrong,' should exempt the
various branches of the government from liability for their torts, and that
the entire burden of damage resulting from the wrongful acts of govern-
ment should be imposed upon the single individual who suffers the in-
jury, rather than distributed among the entire community constituting
the government .... and where it justly belongs.
(citations omitted)
186 See Leake, 720 P.2d at 160 ("IT]he effect of [the public duty doctrine] is identical
to sovereign immunity").
187 Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241-42 (Alaska 1976) ("An application of the pub-
lic duty doctrine here would result in finding no duty owed the plaintiffs or their dece-
dents by the state, because, although they were foreseeable victims and a private
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Thus, the public duty doctrine accomplishes the same unjust results
as absolute sovereign immunity and, like sovereign immunity, must
be abolished.
CONCLUSION
A police officer's duty to prevent an intoxicated individual from
driving is mandatory; once an officer knows the individual is intoxi-
cated, he should be required to prevent that individual from driving.
Neither the public duty doctrine nor discretionary act immunity
should protect the government from liability to injured third parties
in this context. Nevertheless, by inappropriately cloaking the inac-
tion as a discretionary function or a duty owed to the public in gen-
eral rather than to any individual plaintiff, some courts have
protected the police and their government employers from liability.
As a result, injured plaintiffs are denied the opportunity to seek re-
dress for injuries that an officer could have prevented. Holding
police and their government employers liable for negligent failure
to detain a drunk driver is justified because to do so effectively com-
pensates the victim, deters negligent police behavior, and encour-
ages effective government policy in preventing drunk driving. All
courts should abolish the artificial barriers to government liability
and provide those injured by negligent enforcement of drunk driv-
ing statutes an opportunity to seek compensation.
Kelly Mahon Tullier
defendant would have owed such a duty, no 'special relationship' between the parties
existed.").
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